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Montaigne on His Essays: Toward a Poetics 
of the Self- Carl H. Klaus 
How often and perhaps how stupidly 
have I extended my book to make it 
speak of itself! 
BY THE TIME he made this exclamation?in his final essay, "Of Experi 
ence" (818) ?Montaigne had good reason to wonder at how often he had 
indulged in writing about his essays. Had he actually bothered to make a 
methodical survey of his work, he would have found that it "turns in upon 
itself" in his prefatory note "To the Reader" and in 27 of his 107 essays.1 
He would also have found that in most of these 27 essays, such self-regard 
ing comments are not confined to just a sentence or two, but take up sev 
eral paragraphs, often scattered over two or three pages or more. And he 
would have found that this preoccupation manifests itself more often and 
at greater length as he moves from Book I to Book II to Book III of his 
essays, so that it gradually becomes a leitmotif of the work as a whole. But 
such findings probably would not have led him to eliminate or reduce such 
reflexive passages. Indeed, in keeping with his avowedly contrary and 
unpredictable behavior, Montaigne chose to expand many of these 
passages in the process of revising his work. In the final version of his 
essays, for example, he turned the exclamatory statement that opens this 
piece into a full paragraph by adding two lengthy sentences which end in a 
justification of writing about his writing, "because my theme turns in 
upon itself . . ." (818). 
Having made this excuse for essaying his essays, Montaigne immedi 
ately wondered whether his readers would "accept it" and thereby allay his 
fear of having "stupidly" engaged in the very self-regarding activity he had 
previously scorned in others. Far from exposing himself to ridicule, he 
established a very alluring precedent, for essayists to this day have contin 
ued to write about their essays, about other essayists, and about the nature 
of the essay itself.2 Montaigne not only set this self-reflexive precedent, 
but he also defined most of the issues that concern subsequent essayists on 
the essay. So, Montaigne's self-reflexive comments are significant both as 
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an embodiment of his thinking about the essay and as a harbinger of subse 
quent ideas of the essay. 
In the course of reflecting on his essays, Montaigne covers almost the 
entire spectrum of topics that might be of interest to an essayist or student 
of the essay?from composing and revising his essays to editing and pub 
lishing them, from their purpose and content to their form and style, 
including matters as varied as the titles, the length, the intelligibility, and 
the truth of his essays. In commenting on these topics, however, Mon 
taigne rarely stops to reflect at length on any single aspect of his writing. 
Indeed, "being a sworn enemy of obligation, assiduity, perseverance" 
(76), he often shifts abruptly from one idea or experience or allusion to 
another, no matter what topic he happens to be discussing. As he moves 
from one essay to the next, or one book of essays to the next, or one edi 
tion of the essays to the next, he often returns to issues he has discussed 
before, but sometimes he takes a different slant on the matter, so much so 
that by his own admission he contradicts himself "now and then" (611). 
Though scattered, undeveloped, and sometimes contradictory, Mon 
taigne's reflections on his writing do, I think, center on an interrelated set 
of issues that can be discerned if one surveys his comments collectively 
from beginning to end. In particular, they persistently engage issues 
related to Montaigne's unprecedented self-absorption, his radical subjec 
tivity, and his bold refusal to abide by the canons of scholastic specializa 
tion: 
I speak my mind freely on all things, even on those which per 
haps exceed my capacity and which I by no means hold to be 
within my jurisdiction. And so the opinion I give of them is to 
declare the measure of my sight, not the measure of things. (298) 
Authors communicate with the people by some special extrin 
sic mark: I am the first to do so by my entire being, as Michel de 
Montaigne, not as a grammarian or a poet or a jurist. (611) 
Given so keen an awareness that his essays constituted "a new and extra 
ordinary amusement" (273), "the only book in the world of its kind" 
(278), it is hardly surprising that he might have been moved to celebrate 
all the distinctive aspects and elements of his globally subjective enterprise. 
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Indeed, Montaigne's persistent comments and reflections on his writing 
punctuate the essays like advertisements or fanfare for his new literary ven 
ture?as 
exuberantly unrestrained as his essays themselves. Collectively, 
they constitute a dramatic embodiment of Montaigne's anti-scholastic 
approach, offering not a methodical rhetoric, but a flamboyant anti 
rhetoric, of the essay. 
Yet it is also clear that these persistent reflections on his writing were 
occasioned not just by the impulse to celebrate his subjectivity, but also by 
a preoccupation with the problematics of making himself "the matter of 
[his] book." Indeed, in reading through Montaigne's comments on his 
writing, one cannot help noticing how frequently they turn back upon 
himself, no matter what particular aspect of his essays he happens to be dis 
cussing. In reflecting on his use of other authors, for example, he touches 
on a number of pertinent issues, such as the value of compendia, the injus 
tice of plagiarism, and the pretentiousness of extensive allusions. But his 
reflections ultimately bear witness to the struggle he evidently went 
through in trying to convey his own ideas, to be true to his own train of 
thought, while also being unavoidably conscious of how deeply influenced 
he was by his admittedly extensive reading. At one point, for example, he 
goes out of his way to make clear that he quotes others not as authority, 
but as a means of self-expression: "I do not speak the minds of others ex 
cept to speak my own mind better" (108). At another point, he claims that 
"when I write, I prefer to do without the company and remembrance of 
books, for fear they may interfere with my style. Also because, in truth, 
the good authors humble and dishearten me too much" (666). As these 
comments suggest, Montaigne keenly felt the anxiety of influence, despite 
the fact that he lived in an era before it became a central preoccupation of 
literary consciousness. Thus, here as elsewhere, Montaigne's comments 
on his writing persistently reflect his concern with finding a viable form in 
which and through which to explore himself, express himself, and write 
about himself. 
The richness and complexity of Montaigne's thoughts on this problem 
are prefigured in his brief opening note "To the Reader": 
This book was written in good faith, reader. It warns you 
from the outset that in it I have set myself no goal but a domes 
tic and private one. I have had no thought of serving either you 
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or my own glory. My powers are inadequate for such a pur 
pose. I have dedicated it to the private convenience of my rela 
tives and friends, so that when they have lost me (as soon they 
must), they may recover here some features of my habits and 
temperament, and by this means keep the knowledge they have 
had of me more complete and alive. 
If I had written to seek the world's favor, I should have 
bedecked myself better, and should present myself in a studied 
posture. I want to be seen here in my simple, natural, ordinary 
fashion, without straining or artifice; for it is myself that I por 
tray. My defects will be read to the life, and also my natural 
form, as far as respect for the public has allowed. Had I been 
placed among those nations which are said to live still in the 
sweet freedom of nature's first laws, I assure you I should very 
gladly have portrayed myself here entire and wholly naked. 
Thus, reader, I am myself the matter of my book; you would 
be unreasonable to spend your leisure on so frivolous and vain a 
subject. (2) 
In this prefatory note, Montaigne clearly identifies himself as the subject 
of his essays, but his manner is so provocative, so paradoxical, so playful 
even, as to suggest right off that the note is in part an elaborate literary 
gesture designed to overcome some of the uneasiness that he must have felt 
as a result of having made himself "the matter" of his book. Lacking any 
notable precedents for so solipsistic an enterprise, Montaigne must have 
wondered how to defend himself against the obvious charge of being arro 
gantly preoccupied with himself. As if to forestall such a charge, he repeat 
edly disclaims any interest in his "own glory" or in "the world's favor." 
Indeed, he carries this self-deprecatory posture so far as to conclude with 
the declaration that his avowed subject is "frivolous and vain." In a simi 
larly paradoxical vein, he reiteratively disavows any interest in the reader 
whom he addresses so solicitously. In a variety of ways, then, this prefa 
tory note is so hyperbolically at war with itself as to seem like a rhetorical 
tour deforce, intended to disarm his potential critics by amusing them with 
its witty contradictions. 
In its playful way, however, this brief note also constitutes a pointed 
manifesto, a literary declaration of independence from the fundamental 
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assumptions and practices of classical rhetoric and medieval scholasticism. 
The revolutionary nature of Montaigne's enterprise comes through most 
directly, of course, in his bold assertion that "I am myself the matter of my 
book," an assertion which immediately makes clear that his book is not a 
conventional treatise in philosophy, theology, or any other field of knowl 
edge. No less revolutionary is his insistent repudiation of interest in his 
nominal reader, for such disclaimers tacitly challenge the fundamental 
premises of any rhetorical enterprise. In one sense, of course, Montaigne's 
dismissal of the reader ?his arhetorical posture ?constitutes the most 
powerful way of authenticating his concern with himself. But in another 
sense, his repeated attentions to the reader suggest a desire on his part not 
to 
repudiate the reader altogether so much as to repudiate a conventional 
ized relationship of writer and reader. This seemingly paradoxical treat 
ment of the reader ultimately speaks for a desire to reconstitute the rela 
tionship along new lines, according to which presumably the reader will 
make none of the usual expectations in reading Montaigne, but will 
follow him no matter how "frivolous and vain," or wandering and unpre 
dictable, he may seem to be. In this respect, the note seems to be making a 
claim for something very much like a rhetorical carte blanche. 
Montaigne also challenges traditional conventions here by declaring his 
commitment to a 
"simple, natural, ordinary fashion." In keeping with 
this stance, he openly rejects "a studied posture," much as he rejects any 
kind of 
"straining or artifice." This rebellious preference for being natural 
rather than artificial, "naked" rather than "bedecked," is justified by Mon 
taigne on the grounds of its connection to his overriding concern with 
himself?"it is myself that I portray." Given this intention to present him 
self as authentically as possible, to "keep the knowledge" that his relatives 
and friends have had of him "more complete and alive," Montaigne com 
mits himself to a way of writing that he ultimately associates with an 
Edenic vision of purity and simplicity, reflected in the "sweet freedom of 
nature's first laws." The essay, in effect, is presented here as being a kind of 
writing that hearkens back to an Unf?llen? prerhetorical? world. From 
the very start, then, Montaigne overtly allies the essay with an anti 
worldly impulse, and by extension with an anti-conventional style. And as 
if to confirm the rebelliousness of his essays, he concludes this address to 
the reader by openly acknowledging the anti-pragmatical nature of their 
focus upon "so frivolous and vain a subject." 
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Though Montaigne dwells in this note on his commitment to a "simple, 
natural, ordinary fashion," he also reveals here some of the conditions that 
work against a literal-minded conception and fulfillment of that ideal. In 
the first two sentences of the second paragraph, for example, though he 
explicitly distinguishes worldly forms of writing from his own personal 
style, he implicitly suggests that his commitment to natural form entails a 
self-consciously public gesture. To say, for example, that "If I had written 
to seek the world's favor, I should have bedecked myself better" does not 
deny the act of having bedecked himself even under the present circum 
stances. Similarly, to assert that "I want to be seen here in my simple, 
natural, ordinary fashion, without straining or artifice" suggests that he 
looks upon his writing as a public performance, calculatedly contrived to 
make a visible impression of naturalness in an apparently effortless way. 
So, too, his statement that "it is myself that I portray" evokes the image of 
Montaigne sitting for his own self-portrait. Montaigne's consciousness of 
being in the public eye becomes most pronounced in the next three sen 
tences, when he openly acknowledges that his "natural form" can only be 
followed "as far as respect for the public has allowed," and that he feels 
constrained by the conventions of public discourse, because he does not 
live in one of those nations that are governed by the "sweet freedom of 
nature's laws." This passage, then, has the residual effect of depicting 
Montaigne's essays as an inherently problematic kind of writing, in that 
they arise out of an impulse to be completely free of rhetorical constraints, 
yet they presumably take a form that is to some extent influenced by those 
constraints.3 
Montaigne's implicit conception of his essays as a problematic mode of 
self-portraiture is complicated most of all by his idea of the self, which he 
identifies with his thoughts more than with any other dimension of his be 
ing: 
What I chiefly portray is my cogitations, a shapeless subject 
that does not lend itself to expression in actions. It is all I can do 
to couch my thoughts in this airy medium of words. (274) 
As this passage suggests, Montaigne's idea of self-portraiture involves him 
in the very difficult, if not impossible, task of depicting his "cogitations." 
The difficulty, as he makes poignantly clear through the metaphor of 
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painting, arises out of an attempt to give visible form and shape to 
something that is essentially invisible and "shapeless," to "portray" 
something that is essentially intangible, especially given the intangibility, 
the 
"airy medium," of language itself. 
But Montaigne represents the problem in even more complex terms, for 
he conceives of the self as being most authentically reflected not just in 
thoughts per se, but in the flow of thought, in the process of meditation. 
To portray himself, in other words, requires not an exposition of his 
thoughts, but a depiction, as it were, of his mind in the process of think 
ing. For Montaigne, then, the ultimate challenge is to convey the experi 
ence of thinking itself: 
It is a thorny undertaking, and more so than it seems, to follow 
a movement so wandering as that of our minds, to penetrate 
the opaque depths of its innermost folds, to pick out and 
immobilize the innumerable flutterings that agitate it. (273) 
As he defines the problem in this passage, it is caused in part by the very 
digressive habit of the mind, which he depicts as being so dynamic in its 
"wandering," so given to "movement," to "innumerable flutterings," 
that "to follow" it is, indeed, "a thorny undertaking." In fact, as his final 
metaphor suggests, the thorniness is caused by attempting not only to 
track the flow of one's thought, but also to record the flow and thus 
"immobilize" it at the very same time that one is immersed in the process 
of thinking. Thus the undertaking is, indeed, "more [thorny] than it 
seems," because it entails a perceptual juggling act that is logically impos 
sible without a radical division of mental consciousness into subject and 
object, into the observer and the thing observed. Montaigne's ultimate 
goal, then, is to depict the self as it is known only by the self alone. 
Given his commitment to this dizzying mental task, Montaigne evi 
dently went to extraordinary lengths to devise a way of generating his 
essays that would leave his mind free to follow its own inclinations, as 
well as enable him to follow and record its wandering movements as 
closely and as accurately as possible. He describes or reflects on his compos 
ing process in numerous passages, and collectively they create the impres 
sion that his writing arises out of a process so free of any mental preplann 
ing, outlining, structuring, rearranging, or editing as to be completely 
uninhibited: 
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I let my thoughts run on, weak and lowly as they are, as I have 
produced them, without plastering and sewing up the flaws 
. . . (107) 
I take the first subject that chance offers. They are all equally 
good to me. And I never plan to develop them completely. 
(219) 
I have no other marshal but fortune to arrange my bits. As 
my fancies present themselves, I pile them up; now they come 
pressing in a crowd, now dragging single file. (297) 
Here, as elsewhere, Montaigne claims to write "without a plan and with 
out a promise" (219), "without definitions, without divisions, without 
conclusions" (483), "without any system" (824). His composing process, 
as he describes it in these and other such passages, is purportedly so sponta 
neous, so free from any kind of artificial manipulation or intervention on 
his part, that he appears to be something of a passive agent, whose 
thoughts take whatever direction they will, and thus whose essays are 
shaped by "chance" and "fortune" rather than by personal intention or 
intervention ?by "nature" rather than "by art." Indeed, he implicitly 
depicts himself in these passages not as an author, carefully planning and 
shaping his material, but as an amanuensis, slavishly recording and piling 
things up as they come to mind, "without plastering and sewing up the 
flaws." Montaigne is presumably so eager to let his mind follow its own 
bent and to include all of its ramblings that he claims to "pile up only the 
headings of subjects," rather than obliging himself to develop them into 
"numberless essays" (185). For similar reasons, he refuses to be distracted 
by the bother of correcting the punctuation or spelling of his essays 
(666-7, 736-7). In fact, he declares himself at one point to be opposed to 
correction of any kind, because he does not wish to misrepresent himself 
by excluding "the imperfections that are ordinary and constant in me." 
(667). It seems quite fitting, then, that in the last of his comments on 
writing, he refers to his work as "this fricassee that I am scribbling" (826). 
Just as he avows an uninhibited composing process, so Montaigne also 
proclaims his prose to be free from any mechanical or methodical con 
straints?"My style and my mind alike go roaming" (761). In keeping 
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with this image of a style attuned to the freedom of his mind, Montaigne 
repeatedly characterizes his prose as being "natural," "simple," 
"ordinary," "plain," or "free," rather than "artificial," "affected," "pedan 
tic," "studied," or "strained."4 Montaigne's eagerness to distinguish his 
writing from traditional forms of composition becomes so intense that in 
his later essays he tends to use increasingly more extreme adjectives and 
figures to reinforce the contrast, referring to his own writing, for 
example, as "crude," "harsh," "disjointed," "imperfect," or "undisci 
plined" and to traditional types as "even," "orderly," "polished," and 
"smooth."5 Much as he disclaims any polish in his style, so he disavows 
any structure in his essays or in his work as a whole: 
I want the matter to make its own divisions. It shows well 
enough where it changes, where it concludes, where it begins, 
where it resumes, without my interlacing it with words, with 
links and seams introduced for the benefit of weak or heedless 
ears, and without writing glosses on myself. (761) 
The scholars distinguish and mark off their ideas more spe 
cifically and in detail. I, who cannot see beyond what I have 
learned from experience, without any system, present my ideas 
in a general way, and tentatively. As in this: I speak my mean 
ing in disjointed parts, as something that cannot be said all at 
once and in a lump. Relatedness and conformity are not found 
in low and common minds such as ours. (824) 
In these and numerous other passages, Montaigne clearly and unrelent 
ingly contrasts his work with the methodical discourse of classical rhetoric 
and medieval scholasticism, and as if to reinforce the contrast he directly 
expresses his impatience with Cicero's "way of writing, and every other 
similar way," with "his prefaces, definitions, partitions, etymologies," 
claiming that "these logical and Aristotelian arrangements are not to the 
point" (301). Montaigne's objections to such highly formalistic and logi 
cal 
"arrangements" were occasioned obviously by his sense that they were 
expressive of a mental certitude about the nature of things that he did not 
possess ?"If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would not make essays, 
I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on trial" 
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(611). So it is that he self-consciously espoused an unstructured mode of 
writing attuned to his sense of the mind's wandering movement and thus 
of his frequently shifting perception of things. By pitting himself so clearly 
and so persistently against Aristotle, Cicero, and the medieval scholastics, 
Montaigne established the now conventional posture of the essayist as an 
independent, often skeptical mind, exploring ideas and experience outside 
the confines of received or prevailing intellectual structures. In doing so, 
he established the essay as an open form of writing, at odds with systema 
tized bodies of knowledge and systematized modes of transmitting 
knowledge:6 
Learning treats of things too subtly, in a mode too artificial 
and different from the common and natural one. . . . If I were of 
the trade, I would naturalize art as much as they artify nature. 
(666) 
Yet even in the act of staking out so iconoclastic and libertarian a role 
for himself and for the essay, Montaigne was evidently quite conscious, as 
implied by his prefatory note and by the numerous comments bearing wit 
ness to his elaborately contrived attempts at "free writing," that his own 
composing process and his own prose were not so free and natural as they 
might seem. As early as the first edition, for example, in speaking of his 
"harsh" style (483), he acknowledges that "I am quite conscious that 
sometimes I let myself go too far, and that in the effort to avoid art and 
affectation, I fall back into them in another direction" (484). By the sec 
ond edition, he openly admits that his way of writing is deliberately calcu 
lated to create the illusion of being a free and natural activity: 
I go out of my way, but rather by license than carelessness. My 
ideas follow one another, but sometimes it is from a distance, 
and look at each other, but with a sidelong glance. I have run 
my eyes over a certain dialogue of Plato, a fantastic motley in 
two parts, the beginning part about love, all the rest about 
rhetoric. The ancients do not fear these changes, and with 
wonderful grace they let themselves thus be tossed in the wind, 
or seem to. The titles of my chapters do not always embrace 
their matter; often they only denote it by some sign, like those 
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other titles, The Maid of Andros, The Eunuch, or those other 
names, Sulla, Cicero, Torquatus. I love the poetic gait, by leaps 
and gambols. It is an art, as Plato says, light, flighty, daemonic. 
There are works of Plutarch's in which he forgets his theme, in 
which the treatment of his subject is found only incidentally, 
quite smothered in foreign matter. See his movements in "The 
Daemon of Socrates." Lord what beauty there is in these lusty 
sallies and this variation, and more so the more casual and acci 
dental they seem. 
It is the inattentive reader who loses my subject, not I. Some 
word about it will always be found off in the corner, which 
will not fail to be sufficient, though it takes little room. I seek 
out 
change indiscriminately and tumultuously. My style and 
my mind alike go roaming. (761) 
From the beginning to the end of this passage, Montaigne seeks to dis 
pel any notion that his essays are the product of undisciplined thinking and 
writing. Indeed, Montaigne is so concerned here to distinguish his inten 
tional digressiveness from authorial carelessness or casualness that he 
devotes this lengthy passage to defining, illustrating, and explaining a 
revolutionary concept of textual coherence which accounts for the unity of 
his work. He defines this concept in the second sentence, by means of an 
arresting personification which endows his "ideas" with the capacity to 
"follow one another, but . . . from a distance, and look at each other, but 
with a sidelong glance." As this personification suggests, Montaigne con 
ceives of his ideas as being so deeply allied to each other and attuned to 
each other that their inner cohesiveness has the power to overcome the 
surface digressiveness of his prose. Having defined his special theory of 
coherence, Montaigne then proceeds to cite the classical precedents for it 
in Plato's Phaedrus and Plutarch's "The Daemon of Socrates," carefully 
drawing out the parallels between these works and his own by noting that 
"the ancients ... let themselves ... be tossed in the wind, or seem to." 
This repeated concern with a calculatedly wrought impression of digres 
siveness reaches its climax at the end of the first paragraph in Montaigne's 
exclamatory transformation of the concept into an esthetic principle? 
"Lord what beauty there is in these lusty sallies and this variation, and 
more so the more casual and accidental they seem." In this bold exclama 
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tion, Montaigne openly avows his commitment to a policy not of natural 
ness, but of studied casualness, or to be more exact, of artful artlessness. 
Indeed, in the paragraph immediately following this exclamation, he 
brashly declares that "it is the inattentive reader who loses my subject, not 
I. Some word about it will always be found off in a corner, which will not 
fail to be sufficient, though it takes little room" (761). According to this 
extended set of reflections, Montaigne depicts his essays as the outcome of 
a 
complex mental balancing act, in which he lets his thoughts wander freely 
enough so that they seem to be "casual" and "accidental," yet keeps them 
sufficiently controlled so that they do "follow one another," no matter 
how superficially disconnected they may seem to be.7 He conceives of his 
writing, then, as being at once the embodiment and the enactment of a 
mind freely following its own changeable directions? a paradoxical con 
ception of essayistic form that is echoed by essayists as varied as Adorno, 
Gass, Gerould, Hardwick, Hoagland, Kazin, and White. 
Given this conception of his essays, Montaigne clearly recognized that 
they call for a correspondingly radical approach to reading and interpreta 
tion, the nature of which he insinuates throughout the previous passage. 
For 
example, in discussing both his essays and their classical precedents, he 
focuses attention on aspects of their form that defy the conventional 
expectations of readers, such as chapter titles that "do not always embrace 
their matter," abrupt "changes" in "subject" from one part of a piece to 
the next or even from one sentence to the next, and statements of "theme" 
that can be "found only incidentally, quite smothered in foreign matter . . . 
off in a corner, which will not fail to be sufficient, though it takes little 
room." Elsewhere, in a similar vein, he acknowledges that his essays are 
filled with "stories" and 
"quotations" that "often bear, outside of my sub 
ject, the seeds of a richer and bolder material, and sound obliquely a subtler 
note, both for myself, who do not wish to express anything more, and for 
those who get my drift" (185). Given such a welter of apparently distract 
ing or misleading elements, Montaigne's essays, as he recognizes, are cer 
tain to confound an "inattentive reader," especially one who is accustomed 
to 
methodically written texts that contain "links and seams introduced for 
the benefit of weak and heedless ears" (761). His essays, in other words, 
cannot be literally interpreted, because they do not assert their meaning in 
the forthright and systematic ways that characterize rhetorical and scho 
lastic discourse. Indeed, given their allusive, digressive, disjunctive, ellip 
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tical, and suggestive form, his essays require instead a reader especially 
attuned to following him on all of his mental jaunts, a reader who like him 
"love[s] the poetic gait, by leaps and gambols." Thus, in this passage as in 
others, Montaigne emphatically allies his essays with texts that use lan 
guage imaginatively and thus require literary rather than literal interpreta 
tion. 
The need for such interpretation is especially compelling in the case of 
Montaigne's numerous statements about the subjectivity of his work. 
Most of these widely scattered comments contain echoes of his prefatory 
assertion that "I am myself the matter of my book," so one can easily be 
lulled into taking them at face value, as reiterations and reaffirmations of 
his self-regarding activity. But from one such passage to the next, Mon 
taigne tends to express somewhat different attitudes or ideas about the 
reflexivity of his work and to invoke correspondingly different metaphors 
pertaining to its reflexivity, as if he were trying out different ways of con 
ceiving, defining, and expressing the relationship between his essays and 
himself. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to examine these passages in 
detail, not only because they bear directly upon the subjective orientation 
that Montaigne claimed to be the hallmark of his essays, but also because 
in doing so they tacitly explore an aspect of the essay that has perennially 
fascinated essayists and students of the essay?namely, the persona of the 
essayist and its relationship to the essayist's self.8 
In some passages, Montaigne depicts his essays as being so intimately 
connected to himself and authentically expressive of himself as to be indis 
tinguishable from himself, indeed, identical with himself: 
It is not my deeds that I write down; it is myself, it is my 
essence. (274) 
In other cases, one may commend the work apart from the 
workman; not so here; he who touches the one touches the 
other. (611) 
Everyone recognizes me in my book and my book in me. (667) 
By equating his book and himself in such hyperbolic terms, Montaigne 
confers upon each the qualities of the other. To read his essays, then, is to 
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partake of his essential being ?that is to say, his thoughts, not his deeds 
? 
as 
surely as if one were literally in his presence, or, for that matter, in the 
presence of his mind itself; and to be in his presence is presumably to par 
take of his book as surely as if one were literally reading his essays ?"he 
who touches the one touches the other." 
But in other statements, clearly at odds with these striking equations, 
Montaigne portrays his writing as being in some sense distinctly different 
from himself. To some extent, the difference results from what appears to 
be an unavoidable obedience to the rules and etiquette of public discourse: 
There is no description equal in difficulty, or certainly in useful 
ness to the description of oneself. Even so one must spruce up, 
even so one must present oneself in an orderly arrangement, if 
one would go out in public. Now, I am constantly adorning 
myself, for I am constantly describing myself. (273) 
Here, as in his prefatory note (2), Montaigne acknowledges the necessity 
to 
"spruce up ... in public," so it might seem at first glance that he is 
simply referring to the act of censoring or editing his thoughts to fit the 
rules of public taste. But by this point it should be clear from his preoccu 
pation with the natural flow of his thought that he is ultimately concerned 
in this passage with the manipulation or distortion of the flow that inevit 
ably arises from the exigency of having to put one's thoughts in a publicly 
intelligible form ?"in an orderly arrangement, if one would go out in 
public." So, he implies, the movement from inner speech to written text 
results willy-nilly in the creation of a persona that is in some respects dis 
similar from his own sense of himself. Thus in the final sentence of the pas 
sage he metaphorically portrays the discrepancy between his writing and 
his thinking, between his book and himself, as being an inexorable state of 
affairs ?"I am constantly adorning myself, for I am constantly describing 
myself." 
This inexorable difference, as Montaigne makes clear, also arises from 
the intimate relationship between himself and his work, a relationship that 
paradoxically divides them even as it ties them to one another, much as a 
parent and child inescapably grow apart from each other despite their 
manifold ties to each other: 
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To this child, such as it is, what I give I give purely and irrevo 
cably, as one gives to the children of one's body. The little good 
I have done for it is no longer at my disposal. It may know a 
good many things that I no longer know and hold from me 
what I have not retained and what, just like a stranger, I should 
have to borrow from it, if I came to need it. If I am wiser than 
it, it is richer than I. (293) 
In this haunting passage from early in Book II of his essays, Montaigne 
conveys the painful sense of distance that has already developed between 
himself and his work, though the work is still in progress, a distance so 
great that he looks upon his book as being "like a stranger." That distance, 
as his metaphor suggests, is the ineluctable consequence of changes that 
Montaigne himself has undergone. He is, after all, no longer the same per 
son who wrote the essays preceding this passage. His mind is not in pos 
session of, or possessed by, the thoughts that occupy his book. Indeed, he 
is "wiser" than his work by virtue of being fully open to experience and 
change as his book can never be, no matter how much he might revise it 
and expand it, while at the same time his book is "richer" than he by vir 
tue of retaining everything with which Montaigne has endowed it, much 
of which he himself may have forgotten or forsaken. 
Given such a clear and evocative assertion of the difference between his 
work and himself, it seems inconceivable that Montaigne could elsewhere 
have laid claim to such a close identity between his work and himself. But 
as if to defy logic, he maintains these two diametrically opposed positions 
at one point within a single passage: 
In modelling this figure upon myself, I have had to fashion and 
compose myself so often to bring myself out, that the model 
itself has to some extent grown firm and taken shape. Painting 
myself for others, I have painted my inward self with colors 
clearer than my original ones. I have no more made my book 
than my book has made me?a book consubstantial with its 
author, concerned with my own self, an integral part of my 
life; not concerned with some third-hand, extraneous purpose, 
like all other books. (504) 
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In the first two sentences of this passage, Montaigne depicts himself as 
having had to compose his thoughts so often in order to make them pub 
licly acceptable and intelligible that he has gradually developed a persona 
that differs in some respects from his own inner sense of himself. Pre 
sumably, he has done nothing more than smooth out the rough and poten 
tially disagreeable edges of his thought, but the process has led him to 
believe that he has 
"painted [his] inward self with colors clearer than [his] 
original ones." So, it would seem from these first two sentences that Mon 
taigne thinks of his work as being somehow different from himself. But in 
the third sentence, he manages to transform the difference into a source of 
identity, by means of an arresting turn of thought, in which he conceives 
of a reciprocal relationship between his essays and himself?"I have no 
more made my book than my book has made me." By recognizing that 
the act of writing is doubly formative?that the self is both the shaper and 
the thing shaped?Montaigne is able not only to resolve the contradiction, 
but also to make the extraordinary claim that his work is "consubstantial 
with its author." In this striking conceit, as in no other moment in his 
essays, Montaigne lays claim to a unique, indeed mystical, identity 
between his book and himself. 
This boldly religious metaphor has understandably attracted consider 
able scholarly attention, so much so that some commentators have taken it 
to be a dominant emblem for Montaigne's conception of the relationship 
between his essays and himself.9 But the closest that he ever comes else 
where in the essays to affirming or reinforcing the consubstantiality of his 
book and himself is in the three very brief passages that I have already cited 
(274, 611, 667). In other cases, by contrast, he refers to the book quite 
simply as a "history," "memoir," or "record" of his "reveries," "ideas," or 
"thoughts" (504, 611, 721, 751, 826), and in doing so tacitly makes a clear 
distinction between his essays and himself. In still other cases, he refers to 
his writing as a "confession," a means of "revealing" himself, or of making 
himself known (109, 242, 273, 296, 495, 751) and in doing so tacitly con 
ceives of it neither as a static record, nor as a consubstantial being, but as a 
devout activity. And in yet another set of passages, more numerous and 
extensive than the others, he refers to his work as a "painting" or "self 
portrait" (2, 242, 274, 296, 496, 504, 574, 610/11, 667, 677, 721, 749, 
809). This metaphor, as distinguished from the others, implies that his 
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work constitutes an artistic likeness, rather than a replication, record, or 
revelation, of his self. 
In trying to construe this mix of metaphors, I have been strongly 
tempted to focus on the image of the book as self-portrait, to give this 
metaphor the heaviest interpretative weight, not only because it appears 
more frequently and pervasively than any of the others, but also because 
Montaigne's fascination with the art of self-portraiture can be traced back 
at least to 1559, some twelve years before he began work on the essays, 
when he "saw King Francis II presented, in remembrance of Rene, King 
of Sicily, with a portrait that this king had made of himself" (496). The 
idea of the book as self-portrait is especially appealing, because it invites a 
richly suggestive line of comparison with the obsessive self-portraits of 
D?rer, particularly with the epistemological and technical problems of 
simultaneously observing and portraying oneself that D?rer had already 
confronted in the visual medium of painting. But Montaigne does not 
seem to have been aware of D?rer's self-portraits, nor does he ever invoke 
the metaphor of painting to explore analogous problems between visual 
and verbal self-portraiture. In fact, as can be seen from the parenthetical 
page references cited above, the metaphor of self-portraiture often appears 
side by side with one or more of the others. And over the course of these 
passages, Montaigne does not give any clear indication as to which meta 
phor takes precedence. In the passage analyzed above (504), the metaphor 
of consubstantiation clearly supersedes that of self-portraiture. But in 
other cases, Montaigne moves so quickly from one metaphor to the other 
that he seems to be using them almost interchangeably or synonymously: 
Others form man; I tell of him, and portray a very particular 
one, very ill-formed, whom I should make very different from 
what he is if I had to fashion him over again. But now it is 
done. 
Now the lines of my painting do not go astray, though they 
change and vary. The world is but a perennial movement. All 
things in it are in constant motion ?the earth, the rocks of the 
Caucasus, the pyramids of Egypt?both with the common mo 
tion and with their own. Stability itself is nothing but a more 
languid motion. 
I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and 
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staggering, with a natural drunkenness. I take it in this condi 
tion, just as it is at the moment I give my attention to it. I do 
not portray being: I portray passing. Not the passing from one 
age to another, or, as the people say, from seven years to seven 
years, but from day to day, from minute to minute. My history 
needs to be adapted to the moment. I may presently change, 
not 
only by chance, but also by intention. This is a record of 
various and changeable occurrences, and of irresolute and, 
when it so befalls, contradictory ideas: whether I am different 
myself, or whether I take hold of my subjects in different cir 
cumstances and aspects. So, all in all, I may indeed contradict 
myself now and then; but truth, as Demades said, I do not con 
tradict. If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would not 
make essays; I would make decisions; but it is always in appren 
ticeship and on trial. (611) 
In this well known passage from the opening of "Of Repentance," 
Montaigne seems at first to be especially committed to the metaphor of 
self-portraiture, for he announces it at the opening of the first paragraph, 
returns to it again at the opening of the second, and then builds upon it 
through the first half of the third paragraph. Indeed, the image he 
develops of trying to paint a subject that is continually in motion seems a 
consummately effective way of suggesting the ambitiousness 
? 
and the 
hopelessness ?of the challenge he has set for himself in trying to convey 
through language the incessant flow of his thought. But, as if in keeping 
with the Heraclitean truth of the passage, he suddenly abandons the meta 
phor of self-portraiture in mid-paragraph and proceeds to define the excep 
tional nature of his task by depicting himself as a chronicler attempting to 
record the history of events that are changing from moment to moment 
? 
a task made all the more difficult because he is himself changing from mo 
ment to moment. Montaigne's metaphors thus reinforce one another here, 
like expressive variations upon a theme, as he spirals towards the climax of 
these reflections on the inextricable relationship between the motions of 
his mind and the movement of his prose?"If my mind could gain a firm 
footing, I would not make essays, I would make decisions." 
Given the restless state of mind that Montaigne acknowledges here and 
elsewhere, it is hardly surprising that he did not ever settle upon a single 
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metaphor or single point of view in reflecting on his essays and himself. At 
some moments, evidently, he regarded his work as being so faithful an 
expression of his thoughts, of his mind in action, as to be virtually iden 
tical, indeed "consubstantial," with himself, or at least to be an authentic 
revelation of himself. At other times, just as obviously, he regarded his 
book as being more nearly an artistic representation, or at least a recon 
struction, of his thinking and thus referred to it as a portrayal of himself, 
or as a history or record of himself. So, he often wavered among the differ 
ent 
metaphors and their differing implications. Yet on some occasions, he 
apparently saw so little difference among the metaphors as to use them 
interchangeably or to resolve their contradictions by a leap of wit or faith. 
In other words, Montaigne did not maintain a "firm" or stable conception 
of his work and its relationship to himself, except, of course, for his 
unremitting desire to bring it "to fidelity" (611). In relentlessly pursuing 
that goal, and in relentlessly reflecting upon his pursuit of it, Montaigne 
endowed the essay with an intense consciousness of consciousness that has 
been, perhaps, its most enduring and definitive quality. 
* 
To conclude this piece simply by noting Montaigne's unstable view of the 
relationship between his work and himself must seem like a small return 
for so large an investment of time and effort as was involved in tracking 
down, sorting, and analyzing his numerous and widely scattered com 
ments on his writing. And in a sense, the return is quite small, particularly 
when measured against the more expansive, definitive, and conclusive 
view that readers ordinarily crave of any writer who absorbs them so 
much as I have been by Montaigne. Indeed, my instincts in this respect 
have led me to make several attempts at pulling together the various 
strands of his thinking on the various topics he discusses, so as to produce 
something here at the end like an explicit definition or summation of his 
poetics. Yet each attempt has led me to experience anew how persistently 
Montaigne's reflections on his writing resist codification. Oh yes, he does 
unequivocally locate himself and his work in opposition to the rhetorical 
and scholastic heritage of classical and medieval discourse, and in doing so 
he clearly establishes the essay as an antigenre, as a kind of writing whose 
distinguishing characteristic is its freedom from the strictures of methodi 
cal form and thought. But in the process of enunciating and elaborating 
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this coherent and overarching position, he repeatedly seems to be poised 
between two or more assertions or attitudes or stances that cannot be 
tidily resolved. At some moments he claims to record the natural flow of 
his thoughts exactly as they come to mind, but at other moments he 
acknowledges the record of his thinking to be an elaborately contrived 
performance, though contrived in order to reflect something like his 
actual thoughts and habits of mind. At some moments he perceives his 
work to be of a piece with himself, but at other moments he regards it as 
being more nearly like a revelation or a self-portrayal or merely a chronicle 
of himself. At some moments he disavows any interest in the reader, at 
other moments he clearly seeks to realign the reader toward the special 
mode of reading and interpretation he considers necessary to an under 
standing of his work. So, any formulation of his poetics would have to 
reflect his wavering view of virtually everything from the inception to the 
reception of his essays. 
To some extent, of course, these unstable views may be attributed to 
changes in outlook and practice that took place quite naturally over the 
twenty years that Montaigne was working on his essays. In his first book 
of essays, for example, most of which are relatively brief, he espouses a 
preference for short pieces by claiming that "I cut myself off so often for 
lack of breath; I have neither composition nor development that is worth 
anything." Whereas in his third book of essays, most of which are much 
longer than those in the first two books, he has altered his view of the mat 
ter: "Because such frequent breaks into chapters as I used at the beginning 
seemed to me to disrupt and dissolve attention making it disdain to settle 
and collect for so little, I have begun making them longer, requiring fixed 
purpose and assigned leisure." 
Such unstable views may also be attributed to the unprecedented nature 
of Montaigne's literary venture. Lacking any clearcut antecedents or 
models for the essay, other than such remotely connected works as the 
Platonic dialogues and the Senecan epistles, he must often have felt uncer 
tain about exactly how to fulfill his professed commitment to a natural 
way of writing. Indeed, given his decision to be guided by the freedom of 
nature rather than the rules of art, Montaigne could not avoid a substantial 
amount of uncertainty both in composing his essays and in reflecting on 
them. In writing his essays, he was, after all, venturing into terra incognita, 
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so it is hardly surprising that his perception of the territory might be 
somewhat indeterminate and unstable. 
In another respect, however, such unstable views are the quintessence of 
the essay as Montaigne conceived of it: 
If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would not make essays; 
I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and 
on trial. (611) 
This conception of the essay as the embodiment and enactment of a 
writer's mental indeterminacy implicitly calls for a reader who, in turn, is 
not 
only willing, but even eager, to "go roaming" in a text that moves 
"by leaps and gambols" and thus does not ever provide "a firm footing." 
Indeed, this spacious view of the essay invites one not to "make decisions" 
or reach conclusions, but to be "always in apprenticeship and on trial," to 
be as open to exploration as the essayist. So, to conclude simply by noting 
Montaigne's unstable view of the relationship between his work and him 
self is, after all, to affirm a way of reading that keeps pace with all the sal 
lies and excursions of his mind. 
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Notes 
1. For specific passages, see Book I, "To the Reader" (2), "Of Idleness" 
(21), "Of Prompt or Slow Speech" (26, 27), "Ceremony of Interviews 
Between Kings" (32), "Of the Power of Imagination" (76), "Of 
Pedantry" (100), "Of the Education of Children" (107, 108, 109, 127), 
"Of Friendship" (135), "A Consideration upon Cicero" (184, 185), "Of 
Democritus and Heraclitus" (219), "Of Vain Subtleties" (227), "Of 
Prayers" (229, 234); Book II, "Of the Inconsistency of our Actions" 
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(242), "A Custom of the Island of Cea" (251, 253), "Of Practice" (272, 
273, 274), "Of the Affection of Fathers for their Children" (278, 279, 
293), "Of Books" (296, 297, 298, 300), "Apology for Raymond Sebond" 
(425, 426), "Of Presumption" (482, 483, 484,494, 495, 496), "Of Giving 
the Lie" (503, 504, 505), "Of the Resemblance of Fathers to Children" 
(574, 595, 596); Book III, "Of the Useful and the Honorable" (599), "Of 
Repentance" (610, 611, 612), "On Some Verses of Virgil" (642, 644, 666, 
667, 668, 677, 678), "Of the Art of Discussion" (703, 705, 718, 720, 
721), "Of Vanity" (721, 734, 735, 736, 737, 749, 750, 751, 759, 761, 
762), "Of Physiognomy" (808, 809, 811), "Of Experience" (818, 824, 
825, 826, 837, 838). 
2. For a discussion of the essay as conceived and defined in this body of 
commentary, see Klaus. 
3. For alternative readings of this passage, see O'Neill, 1-10, and Staro 
binski, 29-31. 
4. For specific passages, see 2, 26, 76, 127, 219, 297, 298, 484, 611, 666. 
5. For specific passages, see 76, 127, 483, 484, 761, 824, 826. 
6. For a discussion of the essay as a genre inherently at odds with systema 
tized and institutionalized modes of gathering and transmitting knowl 
edge, see Anderson, Good, 3-8, Kauffmann, and Klaus. 
7. For an alternative reading of this passage and its implications for a con 
ception of the essay, see Bensmaia, 5-8. 
8. For example, see Gass, Gerould, Good, Hardwick, Hoagland, Sanders, 
White, and Woolf. 
9. For example, see Regosin, 149-224, who regards the metaphors dis 
cussed here as variations on the theme of consubstantiality. See also Staro 
binski's discussion of 
"identity," 26-34. 
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